From 3b76309d87753b001424818361877ffdecfbc50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paco Cartones <253313177+pacocartones@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 17:23:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] fix: correct sigstore-go patched version

---
 .../2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json        | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json b/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json
index 77a1eb57df63..7bb850551676 100644
--- a/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json
+++ b/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "CVE-2026-49834"
   ],
   "summary": "sigstore-go has a multi-log threshold bypass via single compromised log",
-  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.\n\nAs a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.\n\nNote that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nUpgrade to v1.1.5.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.",
+  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.\n\nAs a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.\n\nNote that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nUpgrade to v1.2.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",