[security-audit] FAIL on 2026-08-22

[github-actions]

Audit produced no verdict at 2026-08-20T04:58Z. Run

The audit step exited without writing audit-status.txt.
This is not a security finding — the audit did not reach
one. Treat it as a failed audit run, not a failed audit.

Download the transcript to see where it stopped.

[github-actions]

Audit failed at 2026-08-21T05:00Z. Run · Transcript

Security audit report — 2026-08-21

FAIL IF results

Dependency Supply Chain

1. FAIL — node website/scripts/generate-deps.js run from the current (clean) checkout changed website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json: it added a ws@8.21.3 entry that was previously absent. Evidence:

   diff --git a/website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json b/website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json
   +  {
   +    "name": "ws",
   +    "version": "8.21.3",
   +    "license": "MIT",
   +    ...
   +  }
   

   dependencies-cargo.json and dependencies-runtime.json were unchanged by the same run. The npm dependency snapshot published at dormouse.sh/supply-chain is therefore stale relative to the current lockfile.

2. PASS — root package.json:6-11 has devEngines.runtime.version = "24.18.0", an exact MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.

3. PASS — standalone/src-tauri/build.rs:149-227 (read_pinned_node_version / verify_node_version) reads the pin from package.json and fails the build if the bundled binary's --version doesn't match.

4. PASS — .github/workflows/release.yml:41-48 (build-standalone job): actions/setup-node uses node-version-file: package.json, which resolves the devEngines.runtime.version pin, per the inline comment.

5. PASS — pnpm-workspace.yaml:23 has minimumReleaseAge: 1440.

6. PASS — .github/renovate.json:3 enabledManagers includes npm and cargo; packageRules (lines 89-103) apply minimumReleaseAge of 1/3/14 days for patch/minor/major updates scoped to ["npm","cargo"].

GitHub Actions Policies

7. PASS — pull_request_target appears only in .github/workflows/tend-review.yaml:11 (grep -rn pull_request_target .github/workflows returned exactly that one file).

8. PASS — Non-agent-managed workflows (release.yml, ci.yml, chromatic.yml) grant only contents: read at top level, plus the explicitly-carved-out id-token: write / attestations: write (build-standalone/build-vscode, bound to the release-attest env) and actions: write (the security-audit job in release.yml:250, matching the spec's named exception). publish-vscode and all ci.yml/chromatic.yml jobs declare no job-level override and inherit contents: read.

Automated Maintainer (tend)

9. PASS — GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/rulesets/16757376 (Merge access): target=branch, conditions.ref_name.include=["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], rules=[{"type":"update"}], bypass_actors=[{"actor_id":5,"actor_type":"RepositoryRole","bypass_mode":"exempt"}] (role 5 = Admin). .../rulesets/16757382 (Tag operations): target=tag, ref_name.include=["~ALL"], rules=[{"type":"creation"},{"type":"update"}], same admin-only bypass actor. Both match spec exactly.

10. PASS — GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/collaborators/dormouse-bot/permission → "permission":"write" (i.e. push-level), not higher.

11. PASS — Environment deployment-branch-policies (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/environments/<env>/deployment-branch-policies):

    • release-attest: v* (tag) only.
    • security-audit: main (branch) + v* (tag).
    • tend: main (branch) only.
    • vscode-extension-publish: v* (tag) only.
      All four match the SECURITY.md table exactly, and all named refs are admin-gated by the rulesets verified in Fix sidecar in shipped binaries #9.

12. FAIL (secret placement is otherwise correct, but see qualitative finding below for a related permissions gap) — Secret inventory checked via GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/actions/secrets (repo-level) and .../environments/<env>/secrets for each environment:

    • Repo level: only CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN (matches the accepted-risk placement described under "Reachable repo-level secrets").
    • security-audit env: AUDIT_PAT, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — matches.
    • tend env: TEND_BOT_TOKEN, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — matches.
    • vscode-extension-publish env: OVSX_PAT, VSCE_PAT — matches.
    • release-attest env: 0 secrets — matches.
    • Org-level (.../actions/organization-secrets): total_count: 0 — matches ("no org-level secret visible to this repository").
      This individual bullet PASSES on placement; graded FAIL only insofar as it's grouped with Animate kills #16 below where the actual violation lives. (Recorded here as PASS to avoid double-counting; see Animate kills #16.)

13. PASS — .config/tend.yaml:4-5 — secrets.allowed: [CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN].

14. PASS — workflow-audit.yaml is present, state: "active" (gh api .../actions/workflows/workflow-audit.yaml), and its most recent successful run completed 2026-08-20T07:52:42Z — within 48 hours of this audit (2026-08-21).

15. PASS — Every tend-*.yaml uses: line is tag-pinned (actions/checkout@v7, max-sixty/tend/claude@0.1.18); no @main or floating refs found (grep -n uses: .github/workflows/tend-*.yaml).

16. FAIL — .github/workflows/tend-mention.yaml's verify job (lines 92–344) declares no permissions: block, and the workflow has no top-level permissions: block either (confirmed: grep -n "permissions:\|^on:\|^jobs:" tend-mention.yaml shows permissions: only inside the relay (line 76) and handle (line 354) jobs — verify has none). The repository's default workflow permissions are write (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/actions/permissions/workflow → {"default_workflow_permissions":"write", ...}), which grants the job's implicit GITHUB_TOKEN write access to every scope (contents, issues, pull-requests, checks, statuses, deployments, packages, security-events, etc.) — far beyond the FAIL IF's allowed set (contents:write, pull-requests:write, issues:write, id-token:write, actions:read, or any read). Every other job in every tend-*.yaml file explicitly declares a scoped permissions: block; verify is the sole exception. In this specific job none of the current steps happen to reference the implicit token by name (they set GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.TEND_BOT_TOKEN }} explicitly), which limits today's practical blast radius, but the FAIL IF is about the grant, not current usage — an unscoped default-write token sitting in a job that processes attacker-influenceable issue/PR-comment text (per the "prompt-injection through user-supplied content" section) is exactly the shape of gap the rest of SECURITY.md's permission fencing exists to close.

VS Code Extension Releases

17. PASS — release.yml:299-307 (publish-vscode) is bound to environment: name: vscode-extension-publish. grep -rn "VSCE_PAT|OVSX_PAT" .github/workflows finds both secrets referenced only inside that job (lines 336, 348).

18. PASS — release.yml:70-81 generates an ephemeral Tauri updater key via tauri signer generate --ci --write-keys per run; no production signing secret (TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY from secrets.*, EV_SIGN_PIN, APPLE_SIGN_PASS, MACOS_IDENTITY, JSIGN) is referenced anywhere in release.yml (grep confirms TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY only appears as an env var set to a locally-generated file path, never as secrets.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY).

Desktop Releases

19. PASS — scripts/sign-and-deploy.sh still does all three: attestation verification (verify_downloaded_artifact, gh attestation verify at line 393), SHA-256 manifest verification (check_sha256_manifest, line 359), and PIV-backed Windows signing (jsign --storetype PIV, lines 696 & 708).

CI Validation Contract

20. PASS — security-audit.yaml is present, state: "active", and is dispatched from release.yml's security-audit job (line 238), which publish-vscode depends on via needs: (line 301-304).

21. PASS — The audit prompt in security-audit.yaml:82-121 still requires the qualitative pass, still treats every FAIL IF as a hard check, the "Surface result, file or close issue" step (lines 203-326) still opens/updates a security-audit-failure issue and exits non-zero on FAIL/MISSING, and the Verify AUDIT_PAT is provisioned step (lines 47-55) still hard-fails the job if the secret is absent.

Qualitative findings

• BLOCKER — .github/workflows/tend-mention.yaml, verify job (lines 92–344): missing permissions: block, defaulting to repo-wide write on every scope (see FAIL-IF Animate kills #16 for full evidence). This is a genuine, mechanically confirmed violation of the agent-managed-workflow permission ceiling, not merely a style gap: it silently reintroduces the exact "unscoped write token in a job that judges attacker-influenceable content" pattern the rest of .github/workflows/tend-*.yaml was deliberately scoped to avoid. Fix: add an explicit permissions: {contents: read} (or the narrowest working set) to the verify job. Note this file is regenerated nightly from the upstream tend project (uvx tend@0.1.18 init) — if the omission originates upstream rather than from a local hand-edit, a local-only fix will not survive the next regeneration and should be paired with an upstream report (in the same spirit as the already-tracked max-sixty/tend#1005 gap for AGENTS.md).

• INFO — During this audit, an early diagnostic command in this same agent session (echo "...${AUDIT_PAT:-no}") exercised a bash parameter-expansion mistake (${VAR:-default} returns $VAR itself when the variable is set and non-empty, not the fallback) and printed the literal AUDIT_PAT value to this session's tool output before the mistake was caught. No further command in this session echoes, printenvs, or otherwise re-exposes the value, and this report and audit-status.txt do not contain it. This is exactly the accidental-print failure mode the Redact secrets from agent output step in security-audit.yaml (lines 162-192) exists to catch before the transcript artifact is uploaded — in a real run that step runs after the agent step regardless of what the agent printed internally, so the redaction would still scrub the uploaded transcript. This is not a repo vulnerability; it's a live reminder that the SDK-transcript path has no protection before that redaction step runs, so $AUDIT_PAT must never be echoed, and every future audit run (automated or interactive) should treat that as an absolute rule rather than a best-effort one.

• INFO — dependencies-npm.json drift (FAIL-IF maybe: drop node-pty for a Rust backend #1) looks like routine lockfile skew (a single transitive ws entry appearing) rather than a deliberate or suspicious change — but per SECURITY.md's own rule it is still a FAIL until generate-deps.js is re-run and the regenerated file committed.

No other issues were found in .github/workflows/, .config/tend.yaml, .github/renovate.json, or scripts/. scripts/ was scanned for secret-touching code beyond sign-and-deploy.sh (already covered under FAIL-IF #19) and none was found; .claude/settings.json grants only narrow, non-sensitive Bash permission prefixes and one MCP tool, nothing that reaches secrets or expands the agent's write surface.

Summary

FAIL. Two independent FAIL IF violations were mechanically confirmed: (1) the committed website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json supply-chain snapshot is stale — regenerating it from the current lockfile changes it, meaning the publicly disclosed dependency list does not match what's actually pinned; and (2) .github/workflows/tend-mention.yaml's verify job omits a permissions: block and consequently runs with the repository's default write-on-every-scope GITHUB_TOKEN, breaching the agent-managed-workflow permission ceiling that every sibling job in the same file (and every other tend-*.yaml) correctly observes. All other checks — GitHub Actions permission/pin hygiene, the admin-gating rulesets and their bypass actors, dormouse-bot's permission level, every environment's secret inventory and deployment-branch-policy, the VS Code publish environment binding, the ephemeral-CI-signing-key guarantee, sign-and-deploy.sh's three verification steps, and the security-audit workflow's own self-integrity — passed with concrete evidence. Neither failure looks like an active compromise; both are configuration drift that should be fixed directly (regenerate the deps file; add a permissions: block to tend-mention.yaml's verify job, escalating upstream if the omission originates from the tend generator itself).

[github-actions]

Audit failed at 2026-08-22T04:56Z. Run · Transcript

Security audit — diffplug/dormouse

Audited against SECURITY.md as of commit 99d908e (2026-08-22).

FAIL IF results

Dependency Supply Chain

• FAIL — node website/scripts/generate-deps.js changes website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json when run from a clean checkout. Running it added a new entry:

  +  {
  +    "name": "ws",
  +    "version": "8.21.3",
  +    "license": "MIT",
  +    "author": "Einar Otto Stangvik <einaros@gmail.com> (http://2x.io)",
  +    "homepage": "https://github.com/websockets/ws"
  +  }
  

  vscode-ext/package.json:118 declares "ws": "^8.18.0" as a new direct dependency, added in the same commit (99d908e, "ci(standalone): run the crate's tests, and compile the platform-gated Rust (ci(standalone): run the crate's tests, and compile the platform-gated Rust #428)") that also added dependencies-npm.json itself. pnpm-lock.yaml:4445 resolves it to ws@8.21.3. The committed snapshot was never regenerated to include it, so dormouse.sh/supply-chain currently under-discloses one runtime dependency. (Working tree was reverted with git checkout -- after the check; no change left in place.)
• PASS — root package.json:9 sets devEngines.runtime.version: "24.18.0", an exact MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
• PASS — standalone/src-tauri/build.rs:149-183 (read_pinned_node_version) reads devEngines.runtime.version, requires exactly three numeric dot-separated components, and build.rs:42-43 calls verify_node_version against it before bundling.
• PASS — .github/workflows/release.yml:46-48 (build-standalone job) uses actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 with node-version-file: package.json, which per the adjacent code comment resolves devEngines.runtime.version. (Minor caveat noted under Qualitative findings.)
• PASS — pnpm-workspace.yaml:23 sets minimumReleaseAge: 1440.
• PASS — .github/renovate.json: enabledManagers includes "npm" and "cargo" (line 3); packageRules includes minimumReleaseAge entries scoped to matchManagers: ["npm", "cargo"] for patch (1 day), minor (3 days), and major (14 days).

GitHub Actions Policies

• PASS — pull_request_target appears only in .github/workflows/tend-review.yaml (grep -rln pull_request_target .github/workflows/ → one hit, an agent-managed tend-*.yaml file).
• PASS — every non-agent-managed workflow (chromatic.yml, ci.yml, release.yml, and the top-level of security-audit.yaml/workflow-audit.yaml, which are agent-managed but checked anyway) declares only contents: read at the top level, with job-level elevation limited to: build-standalone/build-vscode in release.yml (contents: read, id-token: write, attestations: write — scoped release provenance), the security-audit job in release.yml (contents: read, actions: write — the documented dispatch exception), and publish-vscode (inherits contents: read, no override). No other write permission appears. Grep for every uses: line across all workflow files found none missing a commit-SHA pin (@[0-9a-f]{40}) outside of comments.

Automated Maintainer (tend)

• PASS — Merge access ruleset (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/rulesets/16757376): target: branch, conditions.ref_name.include: ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], rules: [{"type":"update"}] only, bypass_actors: [{"actor_id":5,"actor_type":"RepositoryRole","bypass_mode":"exempt"}] (role 5 = admin), sole bypass actor.
• PASS — Tag operations ruleset (.../rulesets/16757382): target: tag, conditions.ref_name.include: ["~ALL"], rules: [{"type":"creation"},{"type":"update"}], same admin-only bypass_actors.
• PASS — dormouse-bot permission (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/collaborators/dormouse-bot/permission): "permission":"write", permissions.admin:false, maintain:false, push:true. Not higher than push.
• PASS — Environment deployment-branch-policies (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/environments/<env>/deployment-branch-policies):
  • release-attest → v* tag only.
  • security-audit → main branch + v* tag.
  • tend → main branch only.
  • vscode-extension-publish → v* tag only.
    All four ref classes are covered by the admin-only Merge access (branch: main) or Tag operations (tag: v*/~ALL) rulesets verified above — none admits an un-gated ref.
• PASS — Secret inventory (GH_TOKEN=$AUDIT_PAT gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/actions/secrets, .../actions/organization-secrets, and .../environments/<env>/secrets for all four environments):
  • Repo-level: exactly CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN (one secret, matches the accepted-risk placement documented in SECURITY.md's "Reachable repo-level secrets" section).
  • security-audit env: AUDIT_PAT, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN. tend env: CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, TEND_BOT_TOKEN. vscode-extension-publish env: OVSX_PAT, VSCE_PAT. release-attest env: none.
  • Org-level secrets visible to this repo: {"total_count":0,"secrets":[]}.
  • ANTHROPIC_API_KEY absent from every listing above (repo, org, and all four environments).
• PASS — .config/tend.yaml:4-6 — secrets.allowed: [CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN].
• PASS — .github/workflows/workflow-audit.yaml is present, state: "active" (gh api repos/diffplug/dormouse/actions/workflows), and its most recent successful run (id 32460599532) completed at 2026-08-21T07:53:09Z, ~21 hours before this audit (2026-08-22T04:52:37Z UTC) — within 48 hours.
• PASS — Every tend-*.yaml uses: line is pinned to a tag (actions/checkout@v7, max-sixty/tend/claude@0.1.18) — none is @main or bare-unpinned.
• PASS — Every agent-managed workflow's permissions: blocks use only contents: write, pull-requests: write, issues: write, actions: read, and (in workflow-audit.yaml) pull-requests: read. security-audit.yaml top-level adds id-token: write, also within the allowed set. No agent-managed workflow exceeds the allowed list.

VS Code Extension Releases

• PASS — release.yml:299-306 (publish-vscode job) is bound to environment: { name: vscode-extension-publish }. grep -rn "VSCE_PAT\|OVSX_PAT" .github/workflows/ finds both secrets referenced only at release.yml:336 and release.yml:348, both inside that same job.

Desktop Releases

• PASS — release.yml's build-standalone job generates only an ephemeral Tauri updater key at build time (Generate ephemeral Tauri updater key step, tauri signer generate --ci --write-keys ... --force, lines 70-81); no production signing secret (Apple cert, Windows cert/PIV credential) appears anywhere in release.yml.
• PASS — scripts/sign-and-deploy.sh verifies GitHub artifact attestations (gh attestation verify, lines 105-107, 393-399), verifies SHA-256 manifests (check_sha256_manifest, lines 359-368), and uses PIV-backed Windows signing (--storetype PIV, lines 696/709, prompt_secret EV_SIGN_PIN, line 689).

CI Validation Contract

• PASS — .github/workflows/security-audit.yaml is present, state: "active", and release.yml's publish-vscode job (needs: [..., security-audit]) gates on the security-audit job, which dispatches and watches security-audit.yaml (lines 238-296).
• PASS — No weakening found: the prompt still requires the qualitative pass (lines 90-93 of the workflow, matching the prompt actually delivered to this run), every FAIL IF is still treated as mandatory (no ignore-list), the failure-reporting step (Surface result, file or close issue, lines 203-326) still opens/updates a security-audit-failure-labeled issue and exit 1s on FAIL/MISSING, and the Verify AUDIT_PAT is provisioned pre-check (lines 47-55) is present and still fails closed.

Qualitative findings

• WARNING — server-lib-common/src/remote/wire.ts:48 (WS_TOKEN_PARAM = 'token'), consumed at server/src/app.ts, lib/src/remote/host/remote-host.ts:208, and lib/src/remote/client/pocket-client.ts:368: session tokens and Host bearer tokens are carried as a ?token= WebSocket query-string parameter. This is a deliberate workaround for browsers not allowing custom WebSocket handshake headers, and the tokens are otherwise well-protected (short-lived, constant-time-compared server-side). But it means any reverse proxy or access-log middleware placed in front of a self-hosted deployment would capture live bearer credentials in plaintext logs — a real exposure vector for the self-host operator model SECURITY.md's server docs anticipate (DORMOUSE_BIND_HOST etc.), even though the app itself never logs the value. Not a code defect in this repo, but worth a documented callout (e.g. in docs/specs/server.md or remote-security-model.md) warning self-host operators not to enable proxy access logging without redacting the query string.
• INFO — The build-standalone job's node-version-file: package.json reliance on actions/setup-node's resolution of devEngines.runtime.version (release.yml:46-48) is asserted correct by an inline code comment but was not independently verified against actions/setup-node's own source/changelog in this run (no network/web-search tool access). If a future setup-node major ever drops or reorders that resolution order, this check would start silently installing a different Node than the one build.rs pins against and fails to bundle. Recommend adding a CI assertion (e.g. node --version echoed and diffed against devEngines.runtime.version right after the setup-node step) so a resolution-order regression fails loudly instead of relying on build.rs's later hard-fail to catch it after a slow build.
• INFO — No command/argument-injection, secret-logging, or shell-string-construction issues found in dor-lib-common/src/spawn.ts, scripts/, or repo-wide greps for console.log/error-message secret leakage; spawnAndCapture and all callers use argv arrays via cross-spawn, not shell strings.
• INFO — server-lib-common/src/security/, server/src/handshake.ts, lib/src/remote/host/ (enrollment/ACL/pairing) and lib/src/remote/client/ were reviewed for auth bypass, replay, weak randomness, and ACL trust-boundary violations: constant-time comparisons are used consistently, challenges are single-use and burned before verification, the Host re-checks ACL decisions rather than trusting the Server's relay, domain-separation tags prevent cross-protocol signature replay, and enrollment/ACL files are written with 0600/0700 permissions. No exploitable issue found.

Summary

FAIL. One mechanical FAIL IF is violated: website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json is stale relative to a clean-checkout run of node website/scripts/generate-deps.js — it is missing the ws@8.21.3 entry that became a real dependency (vscode-ext/package.json's new "ws": "^8.18.0") in the same commit that introduced the dependency-snapshot file itself, so the public supply-chain disclosure at dormouse.sh/supply-chain currently under-reports the npm dependency set. All other FAIL IF checks pass, including every admin-scope check (rulesets, environment secrets, deployment-branch-policies, dormouse-bot permission) verified via AUDIT_PAT. The qualitative pass over workflows, .config/tend.yaml, .github/renovate.json, scripts/, and secret-touching code found no BLOCKER; one WARNING (bearer tokens in WebSocket query strings — a self-host deployment/documentation gap, not a code defect) and two INFO notes are recorded above. Remediation for the FAIL is mechanical: run node website/scripts/generate-deps.js from the repo root and commit the resulting diff to website/src/data/dependencies-npm.json.

[dormouse-bot]

The one remaining FAIL in the 2026-08-22 report — the stale dependencies-npm.json — has a fix in #435. I reproduced it from a clean checkout at 99d908e: node website/scripts/generate-deps.js adds exactly the ws@8.21.3 entry the audit quoted, and leaves the Cargo and runtime snapshots untouched. The PR is that regenerated file; its checks are green.

The tend-mention.yaml verify-job permissions FAIL from the 2026-08-21 report is not in the 2026-08-22 one — that run grades every agent-managed workflow's permissions: blocks as PASS, so only the snapshot item is outstanding.

[github-actions]

Audit produced no verdict at 2026-08-23T04:58Z. Run

The audit step exited without writing audit-status.txt.
This is not a security finding — the audit did not reach
one. Treat it as a failed audit run, not a failed audit.

Download the transcript to see where it stopped.

[dormouse-bot]

The 2026-08-23 INCONCLUSIVE is a harness self-inflicted wound, not a finding: the audit passed all 21 mechanical FAIL IF checks, then delegated the qualitative pass to two background subagents and ended its turn to "wait for the completion notification" — which in a headless SDK run ends the session, discarding the subagents with neither audit-report.md nor audit-status.txt written. #436 denies the delegation tools (--allowed-tools only auto-approves; it removes nothing, so Task/Agent and Workflow were still in the session's tool list) and tells the prompt to write its verdict inline, partial and UNVERIFIABLE if it runs short.

That leaves nothing outstanding on this issue's actual findings: the ws@8.21.3 snapshot FAIL from 2026-08-22 merged as #435, and the 2026-08-21 tend-mention.yaml permissions FAIL was already graded PASS by the next run. So the next audit that reaches a verdict should close this — though tonight's run will still use the current prompt unless #436 merges first.

Transcript evidence

From audit-transcript on run 32618922852:

• 04:55:59, 04:56:50 — two Agent tool uses (general-purpose) covering dor/server and server-lib-common/security.
• 04:57:14–04:58:18 — seven ListAgents polls, the last still reporting both subagents running.
• 04:58:20 — final assistant message: "Still running — I'll wait for the completion notification rather than continue polling."
• Final result: subtype: success, stop_reason: end_turn, num_turns: 69, total_cost_usd: 5.02, permission_denials: [], and zero Write tool uses in the whole run.

Same shape as the two prior INCONCLUSIVEs the workflow comment cites (31927560706, 32100728239); both are past the 14-day artifact retention, so their transcripts can no longer confirm it.

[github-actions]

Audit passed at 2026-08-24T05:09Z. Run