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[GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6] sigstore-go: align described fixed version with the recorded range (fixed in v1.2.0, not v1.1.5) #9206

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[GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6] sigstore-go: align described fixed version with the recorded range (fixed in v1.2.0, not v1.1.5) #9206

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6/GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6.json
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"CVE-2026-49834"
],
"summary": "sigstore-go has a multi-log threshold bypass via single compromised log",
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.\n\nAs a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.\n\nNote that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nUpgrade to v1.1.5.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.",
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nA verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority.\n\nAs a result, a single compromised transparency log could forge multiple entries with different indices, and a single compromised CT log could verify multiple times (either across multiple certificate chains or via multiple embedded SCTs), fully satisfying the multi-log threshold requirements and defeating the multi-log policy.\n\nNote that this does not affect Cosign, as Cosign sets a threshold of 1.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nUpgrade to v1.2.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no workaround, beyond relying on trusted logs.",
"severity": [
{
"type": "CVSS_V3",
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