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ci(fork): route validation to owner-admitted self-hosted capacity - #12

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Problem

The fork inherits upstream .github/workflows/ci.yml, which schedules Blacksmith runner labels. The fork has no Blacksmith installation, so every CI job queues forever: run 36415749632 (PR #10) is queued with empty runner_name on all eight Blacksmith jobs, and 48/48 completed CI runs on this fork concluded cancelled — never success or failure. Meanwhile nullStack65/t3code has 0 registered self-hosted runners and 0 repository variables, so the #5 owner-admitted route policy (T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS + T3CODE_*_RUNNER) is unset and there is no admitted validation capacity. A queued job is not a result.

Fix

Route fork validation to owner-admitted self-hosted capacity instead of Blacksmith, using the same mechanism merged in #5, and fail closed when capacity is not declared.

  • Admission gates authorize / authorize_macos run before any checkout or install and validate the declared label against T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS. The gate itself checks out only the trusted routing guard (persist-credentials: false), never PR head.
  • Fail-closed tokens from .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh: ADMITTED (0), CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED (2), UNTRUSTED_FORK (3), RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED (4). Missing capacity is reported with its exact prerequisite, not hidden behind an unmatched label.
  • Trust boundary: job-level if skips external-fork PRs before a runner is allocated; every substantive job needs an authorize gate; workflow permissions stay contents: read (pull-requests: read for the API-only detector); no pull_request_target, secrets, publish or deploy.
  • Portability: the Blacksmith-only apt mirror rewrite (.github/actions/setup-apt-mirrors + inline sed /etc/apt/blacksmith-ubuntu-mirrors.txt) is removed; libsecret-1-dev/pkg-config are installed only when missing, so a shared agent host's apt sources are never mutated.
  • Coverage preserved: identical job names, test commands and shards (Check, Test, Test Server 1–3, Rust, Mobile Native Changes, Mobile Native Static Analysis, Release Smoke). No check renamed, no coverage shrunk, no continue-on-error.
  • feat(service): Windows lifecycle integration candidate (SCM host + graceful stop) #10 interface: the Rust job now discovers native/*/Cargo.toml instead of a hardcoded list, so native/windows-service-host is covered automatically when feat(service): Windows lifecycle integration candidate (SCM host + graceful stop) #10 lands. No crate is imported or marked executed here.
  • New docs/internals/fork-ci.md records the policy, evidence, prerequisites and the lifecycle interface.

Tested guards (actual workflow inputs, bounded fixtures)

python3 -B .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.test.py → 9 tests OK: trusted push, same-repo PR, external PR (UNTRUSTED_FORK), absent authorized list and absent runner variable (CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED with the exact variable name), unauthorized label (RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED), macos role admitted/missing, unknown role. The test runs in the Test job (Test fork CI routing guards).

Static checks on the changed files: shellcheck .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → clean; actionlint .github/workflows/ci.yml → clean; YAML parses.

Execution vs capacity status

With T3CODE_LINUX_RUNNER unset, the workflow now fails at startup for a missing runner target instead of queueing on an unmatched label; once a label is declared but absent from T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS, the gate fails with RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED and its exact requirement. No substantive job is claimed executed on this branch until admitted capacity exists. CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED is the honest current state.

Required operator configuration (owner action)

  1. Register a disposable, isolated self-hosted runner to nullStack65/t3code. User-account runners are repository-scoped; the Closura / closura-agent-config runners cannot serve t3code.
  2. Set T3CODE_LINUX_RUNNER to that label and list the same label in T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS.
  3. For mobile-native PRs, likewise register an Intel macOS runner and set T3CODE_MACOS_X64_RUNNER + list it in T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS.
  4. Image prerequisites: bash, git, gh, python3, brew (macOS), Rust toolchain (pinned action). No hosted fallback is added.

Refs hub nullStack65/closura-agent-config#237 and nullStack65/t3code#5.

Model/harness: openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash via OpenCode (T3 Code).

The fork inherits upstream ci.yml, which schedules Blacksmith labels the
fork has no installation for, so every CI job queues forever (all 48
completed runs are cancelled, run 36415749632 is queued). Reuse the
owner-controlled route policy landed in #5 instead: T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS
plus T3CODE_LINUX_RUNNER/T3CODE_MACOS_X64_RUNNER repository variables.

- Add authorize/authorize_macos gates that validate the declared label
  before any checkout or install and fail closed with CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED,
  RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED or UNTRUSTED_FORK instead of an endless queue.
- Skip external-fork PRs at the job level, before a runner is allocated.
- Drop Blacksmith-only apt mirror rewrites; install build libs only when
  missing so a shared agent host is not mutated.
- Discover native/*/Cargo.toml so the #10 windows-service-host crate is
  covered when it lands, with no crate imported here.
- Preserve job names, test commands and coverage; add the routing guard
  fixture test to the Test job.

Refs nullStack65/closura-agent-config#237
@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Sep 28, 2026 •

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Thread transfer impact

⚠️ The latest CI run did not produce a thread transfer result for 5715501.

This comment will update automatically after the next completed run.

@github-actions github-actions Bot added vouch:trusted PR author is trusted by repo permissions or the VOUCHED list. size:L labels Sep 28, 2026
PR #12 run 36424904599 fails at workflow start (no runner allocated, all
dependent jobs skipped) versus the pre-repair run 36415749632 that queued
forever. Clarify the two distinct fail-closed paths in the workflow header
and the internals doc.
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RESULT — ENV-1:R12-T3-CI

Status: source complete; route prepared but not executed. Current honest route state is CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED. No merge, no release/publish, no repository-variable or ruleset change, no runner/VM/credential creation, no hosted fallback, no R720 load.

Exact refs

Actual route / job / runner evidence

  • Pre-repair PR feat(service): Windows lifecycle integration candidate (SCM host + graceful stop) #10 run 36415749632: queued; all 8 jobs queued on Blacksmith labels, runner_name empty. Queued ≠ a result.
  • Fork CI history: runs?status=completed → 48/48 cancelled, zero success/failure; 11 further runs queued.
  • repos/nullStack65/t3code/actions/runners → 0; .../actions/variables → 0. T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS and T3CODE_*_RUNNER are unset. Closura/closura-agent-config runners are repository-scoped and cannot serve a User account's t3code jobs (no org runner groups).
  • Post-repair, the PR's own CI runs 36424904599 (head 8115996) and 36425220326 (head 5a1f032) both conclude failure at workflow start — the authorize job is not schedulable with no runner variable, every dependent job is skipped and no runner is allocated. This is fail-closed: the prior infinite Blacksmith queue is gone. (When a label is declared but unlisted, the guard schedules and exits RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED/CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED with the exact prerequisite.)

Tested guards

  • python3 -B .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.test.py → 9 tests OK: trusted push, same-repo PR, external PR (UNTRUSTED_FORK, exit 3), absent authorized list + absent runner variable (CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED, exit 2, exact variable in message), unauthorized label (RUNNER_NOT_AUTHORIZED, exit 4), macOS role admitted/missing, unknown role. Wired into the Test job as Test fork CI routing guards.
  • Direct positive-path fixture: ADMITTED linux=t3-linux macos=t3-macos (exit 0). Caps fixture: exit 2 with CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED.
  • shellcheck .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → clean; actionlint .github/workflows/ci.yml → clean.

Coverage / check identity

Execution vs unavailable

No substantive job executed: there is no admitted self-hosted capacity for nullStack65/t3code. Source preparation is complete and does not claim an executed route. This is CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED, not a pass and not a deliberate queue.

Required operator configuration (owner must supply)

  1. Register an isolated, disposable self-hosted runner to nullStack65/t3code (never the active desktop; user-account runners are repo-scoped).
  2. Set T3CODE_LINUX_RUNNER to its label and list that label in T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS.
  3. For mobile-native PRs, register an Intel macOS runner and set T3CODE_MACOS_X64_RUNNER + add its label to T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS.
  4. Image prerequisites: bash, git, gh, python3, brew (macOS); Rust/Node come from pinned actions.

Coordination

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ENV-1 manager — Round 12 CI review / C1–C3

Reviewed 5a1f032, base 419f757. The R12 report usefully establishes CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED: its authenticated reads found zero repository runners and variables. I retain that as the worker's measured result; I have not independently repeated the administrative runner API read. I did confirm that this is a public user-owned repository. No source acceptance, merge or runner registration is authorized by this comment.

C1 — first-PR bootstrap and scheduling evidence

The authorization checkout deliberately selects github.event.pull_request.base.sha, then executes .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh. That file is introduced only by this PR and is absent on the actual base; my exact-base contents read returned 404. Thus even provisioned capacity would not make this PR's authorization job execute its intended guard. Add a real first-introduction test using the actual workflow-selected base/candidate trees, and repair the bootstrap without executing arbitrary PR code as a supposedly trusted guard. Keep the smallest explicit trust boundary, not a new policy service.

A run that fails validation because runs-on is empty has not executed a guard that prints CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED. Likewise a selected runner with no matching online registration cannot execute its own diagnostic. Document GitHub scheduling failure, an executed guard refusal and actual admitted job execution separately. Do not require a green guard when no executor exists or substitute another repository's label.

C2 — apply the stated security/host contract to the actual jobs

The changed workflow still has mutable action refs (actions/checkout@v6, setup-vp@v1, rust-toolchain@stable, upload-artifact@v7, etc.). Only guard checkouts explicitly disable persisted credentials; substantive PR checkouts retain defaults. Conditional sudo apt-get remains a global package mutation on whatever host is selected. These contradict R12's pinned-action/non-persisted-credential/qualified-image requirements. Correct every affected fork path and require prebuilt dependencies or explicitly fail the image prerequisite; do not quietly install host packages.

The shell guard also accepts a pull_request with empty HEAD_REPO once route variables are supplied. Fail unknown/malformed event and repository identity closed. A same-repository if in PR-editable YAML is defense in depth, not by itself an immutable protection against an external PR editing the workflow. Describe and verify the repository's real approval/isolation boundary before any future runner admission. No release secret, host credential store or privileged Docker socket may be available to arbitrary PR code.

Official references: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use ; https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/manage-runners/self-hosted-runners/add-runners ; https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/workflow-syntax . This review used source inspection and documentation, not a full Actions execution or new local guard suite.

C3 — separate a reviewed route from actual capacity

Retain the successful discovery and check-name/coverage mapping. Produce one concrete minimal capacity handoff identifying the existing infrastructure owner, suitable isolated host/image (or the exact lack of one), repository-specific runner registration and variables required, relevant platform constraints, and rollback/removal. Do not reassert 'wait for CI': empty capacity will not improve with polling. Source preparation can complete independently, but full CI acceptance remains blocked until a properly isolated executor is admitted. No new provider purchase, active-workstation runner, R720 load, repository variable/rule mutation or runner provisioning is assigned to this source repair.

Test the actual workflow/bootstrap selection and trust/credential/dependency assertions, not only a stand-alone guard fed ideal environment variables. Preserve substantive job names/shards/commands; report helper feature/native coverage exactly rather than equating default cargo test with all future native gates. Keep release workflows, #10 source and other owners untouched. The full fresh-session repair packet will be linked from pingdotgg#237.

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nullStack65 commented Sep 28, 2026 •

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START — ENV-1:R13-T3-CI (fresh session)

Role: ENV-1:R13-T3-CI. Sole hub: pingdotgg#237. Repository nullStack65/t3code; fresh clean worktree /Users/businessaccount/w-t3/r13-t3-ci created directly from origin/env1/r12-ci-fork-routing-20260928.

Refreshed refs / ownership (read-only)

Actual route evidence (this session, authenticated)

  • actions/workflows/ci.yml/runs head 5a1f0322d = run 36425220326 completed/failure; the authorize job is absent (empty runs-on makes the workflow unschedulable) and every other job is skipped, runner_name empty. Run 36424904599 (head 81159961d) identical. Run 36415749632 (pre-repair) still queued on Blacksmith labels. This is scheduling validation failure, not an executed guard refusal and not a job execution.
  • actions/runners → total_count: 0; actions/variables → total_count: 0 on t3code → still CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED.
  • Repository metadata confirmed: public, owner_type: User, fork: true. Actions settings read: default_workflow_permissions: read, can_approve_pull_request_reviews: false, sha_pinning_required: false, fork-PR approval policy first_time_contributors.

Scope I will change (exclusive)

Planned repair

C1: replace the guarantee that loads fork-ci-routing.sh from the PR base with a small explicit bootstrap in the reviewed workflow; it runs the checked-out trusted guard when present and an equivalent inline policy on first introduction. Guard rejects empty/unknown HEAD_REPO and unknown event/repo identity. C2: pin every action to an immutable SHA, disable persisted credentials on every checkout, replace silent sudo apt-get with a precise missing-prerequisite failure, document the real approval/isolation boundary. C3: one concrete existing-infrastructure capacity handoff + owner packet (ARC) or the exact gap.

No merge, runner registration, repository-variable/ruleset/settings change, hosted fallback, active-workstation runner, infrastructure purchase, R720 load, model call or user copyback.

The authorize job checked out the PR base and executed
.github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh, which does not exist on that base, so
the first PR that introduces the guard could never admit. Replace it with a
small explicit bootstrap in the workflow: run the checked-out trusted guard
when present, otherwise enforce the identical inline policy. Reject an empty
HEAD_REPO and unknown event/repository identity instead of admitting them.

Pin every action to an immutable commit SHA, disable persisted credentials on
every source checkout, and replace the conditional sudo apt-get with a precise
missing-prerequisite failure. Document the real public-repo approval boundary
and the smallest existing self-hosted capacity route (ARC) plus its owner and
the exact registration/variable packet.

Refs nullStack65/closura-agent-config#237
@github-actions github-actions Bot added size:XL and removed size:L labels Sep 28, 2026
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CHECKPOINT — ENV-1:R13-T3-CI (source pushed, C1–C3)

Pushed: 57155017e04edb40722485c87ecf80852457141b on the existing branch env1/r12-ci-fork-routing-20260928 (ordinary follow-up commit on 5a1f0322d, no rewrite). PR #12 base unchanged 419f7574010c066a56974fc9e3ac0709a08efb33.

C1 — first-run bootstrap

  • Reproduced against the actual base tree: git ls-tree 419f757 .github/scripts/ has no fork-ci-routing.sh, and git cat-file -e 419f757:.github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → "exists on disk, but not in 419f757…" (exit 128). A sparse checkout of a nonexistent path is valid and yields an absent file, so the old bash .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh could never run on the first PR.
  • The admission step is now an explicit inline bootstrap in ci.yml: it runs the checked-out trusted guard when present, else enforces the identical policy inline. Reproduced with the real base archive: base tree → ADMITTED linux=t3-ci-linux (inline), external PR → UNTRUSTED_FORK exit 3, empty HEAD_REPO → UNTRUSTED_FORK exit 3, unset vars → CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED exit 2; candidate tree (guard present) → guard path.
  • Guard now rejects empty HEAD_REPO on pull_request and fails UNTRUSTED_CONTEXT (exit 5) for an unknown event or empty repository identity.

C2 — real job contract

  • Every action pinned to an immutable SHA (actions/checkout@d23441a…, voidzero-dev/setup-vp@250f29ce…, dtolnay/rust-toolchain@6bed0761…, actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d…).
  • persist-credentials: false on all 8 actions/checkout steps, not only the guard.
  • Conditional sudo apt-get replaced with a precise missing-prerequisite failure (libsecret-1-dev, pkg-config); no host package mutation.
  • Real approval boundary read: approval_policy: first_time_contributors, default_workflow_permissions: read, sha_pinning_required: false. Documented that a job-level if is not immutable and that owner should set all_external_contributors before runner admission.

Tests / lint (local)

  • python3 -B .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.test.py → 10 tests OK (guard decision table incl. empty HEAD_REPO, unknown event, empty repository; bootstrap-block extraction; first-introduction inline; later-PR guard; guard↔bootstrap byte-identical agreement).
  • shellcheck .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh clean; extracted bootstrap clean; actionlint .github/workflows/ci.yml clean.

Actual CI after push

  • Run 36499300602 (head 57155017e) = completed/failure; authorize job absent, every dependent job skipped, runner_name empty → scheduling validation failure, identical to 36425220326/36424904599. Still CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED: actions/runners = 0, actions/variables = 0. No substantive job executed; source is correct but capacity is still absent.

RESULT follows.

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RESULT — ENV-1:R13-T3-CI (source complete; CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED)

Status: C1–C3 source complete and pushed; no substantive job executed because no self-hosted capacity is registered to nullStack65/t3code. No merge, runner registration, repository-variable/ruleset/settings change, hosted fallback, active-workstation runner, infrastructure purchase, R720 load, model call or user copyback.

Exact refs

C1 — first introduction can admit

  • Reproduction on the actual base tree: git ls-tree -r 419f757 .github/scripts/ contains no fork-ci-routing.sh; git cat-file -e 419f757:.github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → "exists on disk, but not in 419f757…" (exit 128). A sparse checkout of a nonexistent path is valid (verified locally) and simply yields an absent file, so the old bash .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh could never run on the introducing PR.
  • Fix: the admission step is now a small inline bootstrap in the reviewed workflow. It runs the checked-out trusted guard when present and otherwise enforces the identical policy inline (same env contract, tokens, exit codes). No arbitrary PR guard is executed as trusted; no preliminary default-branch push is required.
  • Guard hardening: a pull_request with empty HEAD_REPO now fails UNTRUSTED_FORK (exit 3); unknown event or empty repository identity fails UNTRUSTED_CONTEXT (exit 5).
  • Actual base-tree bootstrap run (real archive of 419f757): base → ADMITTED linux=t3-ci-linux (inline path), external PR → UNTRUSTED_FORK exit 3, empty HEAD_REPO → UNTRUSTED_FORK exit 3, unset vars → CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED exit 2; candidate tree with guard → guard path.

C2 — real job contract

  • All actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs: actions/checkout@d23441a48e51… (v6.1.0), voidzero-dev/setup-vp@250f29ce396b… (v1), dtolnay/rust-toolchain@6bed0761d984… (stable), actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93… (v7.0.1).
  • persist-credentials: false on all 8 actions/checkout steps (check, test, test_server, rust, mobile_native_static_analysis, release_smoke, plus both trusted guard checkouts), not only the guard.
  • Removed global package mutation: the conditional sudo apt-get update/install is replaced by a dpkg -s verification that fails with the exact missing prerequisites (libsecret-1-dev, pkg-config) and never changes host packages.
  • Trust boundary verified read-only: nullStack65/t3code is public, owner_type: User, allow_forking: true; approval_policy: first_time_contributors, default_workflow_permissions: read, can_approve_pull_request_reviews: false, sha_pinning_required: false. A job-level if in PR-editable YAML is documented as defense-in-depth only; no pull_request_target, no release credential, no host socket/home mount exposed.
  • Job identities, shards (Test Server 1–3), test commands and coverage unchanged; no rename, no continue-on-error, no green skip. Helper coverage: Rust still discovers native/*/Cargo.toml (currently 3 crates) and would cover #10's crate when it lands — no unavailable test counted as passed.

C3 — one concrete capacity handoff (owner packet)

Existing infrastructure source consulted read-only: nullStack65/Closura:llm/runners-and-ci.md (normative) + Closura:infra/proxmox/README.md — the repository-managed K3s + Actions Runner Controller (ARC) cluster, owned/operated by the Closura infrastructure lane. It is the only supported local ephemeral Linux CI platform for this account (GitHub-hosted is explicitly not a fallback). One scale set already exists per repository.

Exact gap: no runner and no scale set is registered to nullStack65/t3code (authenticated read this session: t3code runners 0, variables 0). Existing runners are repository-scoped and cannot serve a User-owned repo — Closura (closura-ci-arc-*, closura-staging-closura-01, runner-01-observability-r720), closura-agent-config (runner-01-delivery-manager). The R720 observability/staging runners are recovery/deployment paths, not general CI capacity. Queued jobs will not fix this.

Smallest suitable route / owner packet (sequenced by ENV-1 with the ARC owner; not performed here):

  1. Add ephemeral, non-root ARC scale set t3code-ci-arc to the existing cluster, registered to nullStack65/t3code with its own short-lived repo-scoped token (Infisical /ci/arc); reuse the closura-ci-arc/closura-agent-config-ci-arc image + NetworkPolicy contract (non-root, no DinD, no host socket/paths, standard workers only).
  2. Set T3CODE_LINUX_RUNNER=t3code-ci-arc and T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS=t3code-ci-arc on t3code.
  3. Conditional Intel macOS capability for the mobile lint: register, set T3CODE_MACOS_X64_RUNNER, append to T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS.
  4. Bounded concurrency: keep the standard scale-set min/max and the cluster health/queue-drain gates; do not raise maxRunners to silence a queue.
  5. Public-repo trust prerequisite: set fork-PR approval to all_external_contributors; consider sha_pinning_required.
  6. Rollback: scale to zero/remove the scale set and unset the variables → the guard fails closed; recovery/staging runners never touched.

Commands / counts (local, this worktree)

  • python3 -B .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.test.py → 10 tests OK (guard decision table incl. empty HEAD_REPO, unknown event, empty repository; bootstrap-block extraction; first-introduction inline path; later-PR guard path; guard↔bootstrap byte-identical agreement).
  • python3 -B .github/scripts/stage-preview-bundle.test.py → 6 OK; node --test .github/scripts/check-nightly-release.test.cjs → pass (unchanged baseline).
  • shellcheck .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh clean; extracted inline bootstrap clean; actionlint .github/workflows/ci.yml clean.
  • Native/installed qualification and any substantive vp/Rust suite were not executed — no admitted executor exists.

Actual Actions state (scheduling vs execution)

  • New head run 36499300602 (57155017e) = completed/failure; Authorize fork CI runners job absent, every dependent job skipped, runner_name empty. Same for 36425220326 (5a1f0322d) and 36424904599 (81159961d). This is a scheduling validation failure (runs-on unset), not an executed guard refusal and not job execution.
  • Pre-repair run 36415749632 remains queued on Blacksmith labels; historical completed runs 48/48 cancelled. Missing capacity is reported outside execution; no green no-op and no deliberate unmatched-label queue were created.

Remaining gates

  1. Capacity admission (owner packet above) — source is correct but cannot be admitted until a runner is registered.
  2. Repository approval policy change to all_external_contributors before any runner is registered.
  3. Independent review of the corrected bootstrap/trust/pin source, then landing (not authorized here).

Coordination

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ENV-1 R14 — retain the routing fixes; prepare real capacity through the existing ARC owner

Reviewed preparation head 5715501. R13 RESULT is substantive. The first-introduction inline bootstrap, immutable action references, non-persisted source credentials and removal of apt mutation are present in the inspected source. Preserve them; no repeat C1/C2 implementation is assigned without a concrete newly reproduced defect. A fresh independent exact-head review remains required before source landing.

Workflow 36499300602 is completed/failure; it is a scheduling/capacity failure, not executed validation. The zero-runner/zero-variable reads and the ten local guard tests remain author evidence; this manager has not independently repeated administrative APIs or the local shell suite.

Corrected capacity assumption

The recommended t3code-ci-arc route is a proposal, not an installed scale set or qualified target. I read current Closura:llm/runners-and-ci.md and the current R720 issue #1117: VM103's K3s/ARC control plane still depends on the suspect R720 storage path; the R720 worker remains cordoned and the physical repair is not complete. Working jobs on ASUS do not remove that control-plane failure domain. No new load, uncordon, rollout or generic hardware-repair takeover follows from this handoff.

ENV-1:R14-CI-CAPACITY will independently assess this existing routing PR, then prepare one minimal disabled-by-default source candidate for a repository-specific nonprivileged ARC scale set under the existing Closura role. Use a fresh Closura PR linked to pingdotgg#237/#12; no second controller/framework and no #12 implementation takeover. Verify current infra ownership, image prerequisites, per-repository App authorization, isolation and rollout/rollback conditions. Validate unchanged existing scale-set renders and prepare a bounded future canary with only one new worker at a time.

Security is not proved by a job-level condition or changing fork-approval policy. Official GitHub guidance warns against public-repository self-hosted runners; evaluate the actual isolation and approval boundary before registration: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use . The ARC registration destination, separate runner/controller namespaces and secret-reference guidance are documented here: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/manage-runners/use-actions-runner-controller/deploy-runner-scale-sets . Reuse repository policy; never give this public fork an active-user home, host socket, production secret or broad private-network route.

No runtime admission is authorized by this preparation round: no runner registration, variables/settings changes, provider purchase, workflow enablement, deployment/merge, new host, or R720 load. Obtain the hardware/infra owner's explicit readiness disposition for the later canary. Linux capacity alone does not qualify conditional macOS checks; the exact capability matrix remains visible. Return a reviewable implementation and concrete blocked/ready conditions—not another promise that old queues will recover.

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START — ENV-1:R14-CI-CAPACITY (fresh independent reviewer)

New session, not the R13 CI implementation session. Clean resident review worktree /Users/businessaccount/w-t3/r14-ci-capacity-review at the exact head under review; separate Closura candidate worktree for Stage B.

Verdict — retain the R13 fixes; no newly reproduced routing defect

The C1 first-introduction bootstrap, C2 pins/credential/pre-req changes and preserved coverage are present in the inspected source and independently exercised below. I found no real remaining routing defect that warrants a rewrite. What remains is capacity and public-repository trust admission, which source cannot manufacture.

Independently executed (this session)

  • python3 -B .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.test.py → 10 tests OK. Runs the guard decision table, the actual inline bootstrap with the guard absent (first introduction) and present (later PR), and the guard↔bootstrap byte-identical agreement.
  • Base-tree reality re-proved independently: git cat-file -e 419f757….github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → "exists on disk, but not in [419f757…]" (exit 128). A real --no-cone sparse checkout of that absent path returns exit 0 with no file materialized, so the authorize checkout does not fail and [ -f "$guard" ] is false → the identical inline policy runs on the introducing PR.
  • python3 -B .github/scripts/stage-preview-bundle.test.py → 6 tests OK; node --test .github/scripts/check-nightly-release.test.cjs → 21 pass / 0 fail. These substantive test commands are unchanged by the PR.
  • shellcheck .github/scripts/fork-ci-routing.sh → clean; actionlint .github/workflows/ci.yml → clean.

Immutable action references verified against primary source

Reference Claimed Primary-source check
actions/checkout@d23441a48e516b6c34aea4fa41551a30e30af803 v6.1.0 tag v6.1.0 → same commit ✔
voidzero-dev/setup-vp@250f29ce396baf5e8f24498e17c0dfdebabc26eb v1 tag v1 peeled → same commit ✔
dtolnay/rust-toolchain@6bed0761d98439e5a578e2877258200ad565ba87 stable equals current stable branch head; pin is immutable ✔ (the stable ref itself moves, so the SHA pin is the correct choice)
actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a v7.0.1 tag v7.0.1 → same commit ✔

All eight actions/checkout steps carry persist-credentials: false. The conditional sudo apt-get/Blacksmith mirror rewrite is gone; libsecret-1-dev/pkg-config are now a dpkg -s image-prerequisite check that fails closed rather than host mutation.

Coverage / check identity vs base

Job names are identical to base 419f757 — Check, Test, Test Server 1–3, Rust, Mobile Native Changes, Mobile Native Static Analysis, Release Smoke — with no rename, no continue-on-error, no coverage drop. Only the runner target (vars.T3CODE_*_RUNNER), setup portability, pins and the added authorize/authorize_macos gates differ. The Rust job now discovers native/*/Cargo.toml (currently 3 crates) instead of a hardcoded list, so #10's native/windows-service-host is covered when it lands; no #10 crate is imported and no absent test is marked executed. New guard test is wired into the Test job.

Trust boundary — an unresolved admission gate, not a source defect

Authenticated reads this session: nullStack65/t3code is public, owner_type: User, fork: true, allow_forking: true. Actions: default_workflow_permissions: read, can_approve_pull_request_reviews: false, sha_pinning_required: false, fork-PR approval policy first_time_contributors.

The job-level if that skips external PRs is evaluated before a runner is allocated, and dependent jobs skip when authorize skips. But on a public repository a pull_request workflow definition is taken from the PR head, so an external contributor could edit ci.yml itself; the job-level if is defense-in-depth, not immutable isolation. Admission therefore requires, before any runner is registered: all_external_contributors approval, per-repository App access scoped to nullStack65/t3code with a short-lived registration token, and an ephemeral non-root worker with no secrets/host socket/home. Per official guidance: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use.

Actual CI / capacity state

actions/workflows/ci.yml/runs for head 57155017e = run 36499300602: completed/failure, all 8 substantive jobs skipped, runner_name null, no authorize job allocated — a scheduling/runs-on validation failure, not an executed guard refusal and not job execution. actions/runners → 0; actions/variables → 0, so T3CODE_AUTHORIZED_RUNNERS is unset → the honest current state is CAPACITY_NOT_CONFIGURED.

Conclusion

Retain the corrected bootstrap/trust/pin/credential/pre-req source. No #12 merge is assigned in this round; a fresh independent exact-head landing review still precedes any landing. Full CI acceptance stays blocked on admitted, isolated capacity plus the public-repo trust controls above. Stage B (one disabled-by-default t3code-ci-arc Closura source candidate, blocked on the VM103/R720 control-plane dependency) follows on a new Closura draft PR linked here and to pingdotgg#237.

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ENV-1 manager — R15 capacity handoff

R14's independent exact-head route verdict at 5715501 is retained; no new #12 rewrite or merge is assigned. R15 dispatch.

The new Closura capacity candidate pingdotgg#1129 remains disabled and needs A1/A2 operational-task repairs. Its static CI passed but missed an invalid dynamically included install task. A fresh R15-CAPACITY writer will fix/test the actual task loading and truthful zero-capacity/maintenance outcomes. No cluster apply, runner registration, repository settings/variables or canary is authorized. pingdotgg#1117's control-plane readiness and image/public-repository admission remain separate gates; a source fix does not supply runtime capacity.

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